Researchers who study legislatures contend that groups rather than institutions shape policy. This argument forms from perceptions that institutions are unimportant because power has been transferred away from Parliament toward policy communities of actors. Accordingly, it is thought that the institutional framework bears no significance because formal institutions for scrutinising decisions do not have a great impact on policy outputs and outcomes. The thesis of this paper is that differences in access and quality of information accords the Executive an advantage on policy formulation and analysis, a factor that is meagrely extended to constituency representatives. The paper examines information availability and its significance among parliamentary stakeholders, particularly MPs. It is through this analysis that a critique of the status quo will be provided. The paper is directed by the assumption that access to quality information equips the decision maker with informed alternatives pertaining to a particular subject. Constituency representatives in Botswana lacks an elaborate information system. By contrast the Ministers have an army of information providers (bureaucrats) and hence their decisions are unlikely to be challenged by constituency representatives. The results presented here are part of an on going study and should therefore be accepted with great caution.
Introduction
The supreme legislative authority in Botswana is Parliament; consisting of the Of the 47 members of parliament, 27 are backbenchers or constituency representatives, the remaining 20 are members who, in essence, are at the reigns of government. The latter' s loyalty is to the nation and not individual constituencies, albeit the fact that they have constituency seats.
We proceed from the premise that the availability of information and the lack of it determines the extent to which an institution is empowered to make decisions.
Our task, therefore, is to identify and examine these institutions and their information structures so that we can begin to account for why the executive constitute a powerful institution as compared to constituency representatives in as far as policy making and analysis in Botswana are concerned.
The paper posits that the constituency representatives' capacity and ability to hold the executive accountable is undermined by their inadequate access to information.
In examining the Executive and Constituency Representatives capacity and ability to direct deliberations and input on policy generation and analysis, this study takes its lead from a consideration of rational, incremental and mixed scanning theories of policy making (Keynes, 1936; Simon, 1957; Easton, 1965; Lasswell, 1970) ; (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953 , Lindblom, 1959 Arrow, 1994 (Etzioni, 1973 . Rather than employing each of these theories, the study lends its support to mixed scanning theories, which in many ways represent an appraisal of rational and incremental theories to policy formulation. Mixed scanning views policy formulation as involving an appreciation of the problem and a consideration of alternatives without rejecting incremental strategies to existing policies and programs. Thus, this paper investigates the significance of information in policy making against the backdrop of approaches outlined above.
At a micro level, the paper contends that information on policy itself should be availed to those tasked to generate and formalise a policy standpoint. The lack of such information renders those considering a policy proposal incapacitated.
Role of Constituency Representatives and Executive Policy Formulation
This section of the paper investigates the roles of the Executive and Constituency Representatives in Botswana. Institutions are the platform within which policy making takes place. Institutions divide powers and responsibilities between the organisations of the state; they confer rights on individuals and groups; they impose obligations on state officials to consult and to deliberate; and they can include and exclude political actors, such as interest groups, in public decision making (Schattschneider 1960) .
Thus legislatures make laws, executives take decisions, bureaucracies implement them and courts resolves disputes.
Ideally each institution balances each other because the distribution of power and responsibilities within the state ensures that government is both effective and legitimate (John 1988 ).
The two players form a legislative institution. Scholars on the subject of institutions and policy making are divergent on the significance of the legislature in policy formulation, but converge on the point that institutions are the platform within which policy making takes place.
Botswana subscribes to the above theory where the role of legislators is to make laws and scrutinise the executive, the executive is suppose to take decisions and bureaucratically implement decisions. But in practice this is not the case: the executive possesses quality information as compared to the Constituency Representatives and are therefore better placed to make decisions and implement them. Due to the lack of quality information, Constituency
Representatives have been reduced to what Good calls a " rubber stamp" , that is they just endorse decisions taken by the executive. This then has ensured that decision making is skewed towards the executive.
Thus, policy making in Botswana is dominated by the executive and the role of the Constituency Representatives is either to affirm or provide half hearted input on policy and its intended outcomes.
In a parliamentary democracy Constituency Representatives are elected to champion the cause of the electorates. In the process of representing the electorates, the Constituency Representatives attempt to generate ways of improving the quality of life in his constituency. This is done through consistent dialogue with the constituency in order that aspirations of the represented are sourced. These should then be organised into policy propositions that are submitted to parliament for consideration. However practice, in Botswana parliamentary democracy does not correspond to the above outline.
In Botswana, information is generated by bureaucrats, who then channel the information to Ministers, who then present the information in Parliament. The bureaucrats are an important source of information to the executive; in fact it has been alleged (Molutsi 1988 ) that they are the sole policy makers. The bureaucrats also channel information to the Constituency Representatives, but such information is lacking in quality and in most cases is denied. The pursuit of good governance and democracy has meant that politicians have to be at all times accountable to the electorates: they have to posses the right information to question the decision of Governments and to be able to speak on behalf of their constituents. Constituency representatives have neither the time nor the patience to search for information: they also do not have the knowledge of information sources and systems. Therefore, this information has to be provided to them in good time and precise form to enable constituency representatives to make informed political judgements or choices on difficult and complex issues. The information systems put in place for them unfortunately does not reflect a quality information service.
The legislature in Botswana is not separate from the executive. The legislative library, however, depends to some extent on how separate the legislature is from the executive and how independent it is. As already mentioned above the Botswana Parliament is not at all independent from the executive. 
One of the responsibilities of the Division of Information, Research and Public
Relations is to repackage government bills and interpret them to constituency representatives. Since its inception, the division has never done this. Its efforts to ask for an officer who has studied law has also been shot down by government.
This places constituency representatives in a difficult position as they are expected to scrutinise these bills, especially if we consider Thapisa' s (1996) observation that in Africa, the MPs level of education might be an issue as most of them have not gone beyond ' O' level. Thapisa in his study of MPs information needs quotes one MP:
When a policy was debated on the need for irrigation, we needed to know how much water one required to irrigate 10 hectares of vegetables, the rate of evaporation in the dams, whether or not this was an impediment to building dams, and how many dam sites were available in Botswana. When such information is not made immediately available…we are likely to revise the decision we took earlier. This is a waste of time. In the event information is not made available, the ' grapevine' will do because talking to individuals and relevant pressure groups provides much more immediate feedback failing which one' s own initiative -moving from one place to place in the quest for information and talking to the private sector also helps. However one often lacks sharpness because of inadequacy of information to back up motions in which, one' s views stand to be rejected by others. This can be extremely embarrassing (Thapisa 1996:214) .
Constituency representatives in this study also expressed the need for development oriented information on commerce, industry, rural development and agriculture. Members lamented that this information was not available in the parliament library. In Botswana the lack of information has meant that constituency representatives add or subtract very little to what Ministers table in Parliament. Thus, the executive can be said to be more informed than the legislature as it has an educated bureaucracy to provide information. It is still, however, difficult to make any conclusion as to the relevance of the information they provide as the study is still on-going. To help them play this role Ministers are assisted by their bureaucrats. For instance, if a policy on agriculture is discussed in Parliament, the Ministry of Agriculture personnel has to be in parliament (within the official box) to capture all that is being discussed in order to help the Minister of Agriculture with information. In many cases this researcher has observed officials passing documents and small pieces of papers to their ministers during the debate.
Ministers in most cases read statements written by their official.
Conclusion
Parsons (1991) posited that back-bench MPs of all parties are excluded from the policy process. Parsons suggested that there was no formal exclusion of backbenchers from policy-making, but rather a lack of confidence and assertion on their part. As already mentioned above in this paper, such a lack of confidence is a deliberate attempt by Cabinet to reduce parliament to nothing. If government can develop the independence of parliament then it seems that parliament will begin to be assertive. Gasper (1989) observed that a small group of politicians (cabinet) has been largely content to determine the parameters, structures and boundaries of government action. They leave a high proportion of policy definition and routine allocation to their bureaucrats, who inherited and retained a high colonial status.
It was a " board of directors" approach. Picard (1979) Some leading Ministers were former civil servants who knew that the engine of governance lay in the bureaucracy. Gasper (1989) reported that the Botswana Democratic Party which has been in power since independence, felt no need to become the channel for most activities, or to have its own policy analysis structures to control government. It ran a small office with an Administrative Secretary who took care of administrative duties but not policy issues. Instead, it saw economists as better used in other ways and the civil service as trustworthy. This has meant that even its backbenchers cannot rely on party structures to gain information to use in Parliament. On major issues too, the role of the civil servants to analyse and propose has not been curtailed or inhibited.
Constituency representatives, to varying extents, are only a little different in position of appreciation of policies and their intended outcomes than were Southern African Kings in the period of concession seekers. The period of concession seekers witnessed a rise in agreements and policies agreed and signed by the Kings on a little or no information, and tracts of land were given away unconsciously.
